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Payment Reform After PPACA: Is Massachusetts Leading
the Way Again?
By: Stephen M. Weiner*
The Congressional debate leading to the enactment of federal health care
reform legislation (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or the
"PPACA"') paid close attention to the structure and results of access reform
legislation enacted in Massachusetts in 2006 in Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006
("Chapter 58").2 Many of the key access reform elements of the PPACA
mirrored the most notable components of Massachusetts's reform. 3
In crafting the PPACA, the Administration and Congress had to consider the
effect on the federal deficit of the coverage expansion and other benefits
provided for under the legislation. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring
of each proposal during the legislative process became a focus of anticipation,
debate, and controversy. Other, more political concerns became predominant,
* Stephen M. Weiner is the chair of the national health law practice of Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. He also serves as the President of The HealthWell Foundation, a
national patient support foundation that provides financial support for people unable to afford cost
share obligations for costly treatments. The author would like to thank his colleague, Garrett G.
Gillespie, for his assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
[hereinafter PPACA]. The PPACA refers to the Senate version of the Act as adopted without
change by the House. Amendments to the PPACA have been adopted by the subsequent Health
Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, a week after passage of the PPACA,
and are included in the references throughout.
2. Act of Mar. 23, 2010, ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts 77 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of MAsS. GEN. LAWS).
3. These include the individual mandate, Act of Mar. 23, 2010, ch. 58, sec. 12, § 2(b), 2006
Mass. Acts 94-95 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 11I M, § 2(b) (2010)); the concept
of minimum creditable coverage that should be obtained and maintained by all qualifying
individuals, sec. 12 § 1, 2006 Mass. Acts at 93 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
II IM, § 1 (2010)); the formation of state-level health care exchanges (the Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector in Massachusetts) to facilitate access to "affordable" health benefit policies, §
101, 2006 Mass. Acts at 134-45 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q (2010));
insurance reform, §§ 48-100, 2006 Mass. Acts at 117-35 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of MASS. GEN. LAWS) (in Massachusetts, reform of insurance coverage had already proceeded
substantially so was of less overall importance in the scheme of the Massachusetts reform); and
government subsidies for low-income residents through the Commonwealth Care program to
facilitate their obtaining affordable coverage, § 45, 2006 Mass. Acts at 113 (codified as amended at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. II 8H (2008)).
33
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especially relating to increased federal spending on health care expected to
accompany access expansion and subsidies so soon after the substantial deficit
spending authorized in the American Restoration and Reinvestment Act of
2009.4 To obtain an acceptable CBO score, the PPACA contained certain
quantifiable effects on the federal budget. These included tax increases, 5
reductions in provider payments (especially Medicare inpatient hospital
payments),6 and a significant decrease in payments for disproportionate share
hospitals. These reductions assumed, presumably, that the affected hospitals
would benefit from the anticipated increase in the number of previously
uninsured patients who would access their services through non-Medicare benefit
coverage. In addition the PPACA provided for other changes to Medicare
payment policies that were intended to reduce costs while also improving quality,
such as those relating to hospital-acquired conditions8 and readmissions. 9
The PPACA addressed efforts to achieve broader delivery and payment
reform only in relatively limited ways,' 0 in part due to the political compromises
4. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
5. See, e.g., PPACA § 9001, 124 Stat. at 847-53, amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1401, 124 Stat. 1029, 1059-60 (to be codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 49801) [hereinafter HCERAJ (excise tax on "Cadillac" plans); PPACA § 9015(a)(1),
124 Stat. at 870-7 1, modified by § 10906, amended by HCERA § 1402(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1063 (to
be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3101) (additional 0.9% payroll tax); HCERA § 1402(a), 124 Stat. at
1061 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (3.8% investment income tax); PPACA §
9008, 124 Stat. 859-62, amended by HCERA § 1404, 124 Stat. at 1064 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 4001) (pharmaceutical industry fees); HCERA § 1405, 124 Stat. at 1064-65 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (excise tax on medical devices); PPACA § 10907, 124 Stat. at 1020
(to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000B and note) (indoor tanning tax, nullifying § 9017, a tax on
cosmetic medical procedures); PPACA § 6301(e)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 743-46 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. §§ 4375-77) ($2-per-enrollee insurance industry tax); PPACA § 9010, 124 Stat. at 865-68,
modified by § 10905, amended by HCERA § 1406(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1066 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 4001 note prec.) (insurance industry fees); PPACA §§ 2501-2502, 124 Stat. at 306-10 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (increasing Medicaid reimbursement for prescription
drugs).
6. PPACA § 3401, 124 Stat. at 480-88, modified by §§ 10319, 10322, amended by HCERA §
1105, 124 Stat. 1047-49 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(8)).
7. PPACA § 3133, 124 Stat. at 432, modified by § 10316, amended by HCERA § 1104, 124
Stat. at 1047 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)).
8. PPACA § 3008(a), 124 Stat. at 376-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww).
9. PPACA § 3025(a), 124 Stat. at 408-13 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww).
10. These provisions include a national pilot program on bundled payments as an alternative to
fee-for-service payment, PPACA § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj); a
"gainsharing" program encouraging the formation of accountable care organizations (ACOs),
bringing together providers to accept payment based on various incentive models in order more
effectively to coordinate the care of Medicare beneficiaries, id; a "medical home" primary care and
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needed to achieve enactment of such a broad and complex piece of legislation.
But the PPACA also recognized that there are limits to seeking major changes in
the overall structure of, and payment for, health services through using only
Medicare.
By contrast, the political coalition that came together in 2005 and 2006 in
Massachusetts to secure enactment of Chapter 58 made what seems to have been
an intentional decision primarily to address access and to forego dealing with the
necessarily concomitant issue of reducing cost increases likely generated by
expanded access." Supporting this political consensus was the already high level
of per capita state spending on health care in Massachusetts prior to enactment of
Chapter 58, and the then federal Administration's support for the reform's
philosophical underpinning: to move people from reliance on the limited benefits
available through the Commonwealth's uncompensated care pool to broader
reliance on insurance coverage.12
The challenge in Massachusetts was whether access reform would in fact be
followed by broader efforts to contain health care costs, for both the
Commonwealth budget and the private system, through delivery system and
payment reform. Failure to undertake such efforts on a broad basis would
increase costs because of enhanced demand for services but without simultaneous
efforts to restrain those increases.
Federal health care reform, in its preliminary phases, focuses principally on
coverage reform and access, not dissimilar to the initial focus in Massachusetts
practitioners to promote coordinated care with payment based on an alternative to fee-for-service,
PPACA § 3024, 124 Stat. at 404-05 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-5); creation of a Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to develop innovative approaches to payment and delivery
in the federal programs, PPACA § 3021(a), 124 Stat. at 389-92 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1315a); and authorization for the formation of a Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute as a
private, non-profit entity, to undertake comparative clinical outcomes research associated with
effective and efficient treatment options, PPACA § 6301(a), 124 Stat. at 728-29 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1320e).
11. Chapter 58 did, though, contain provisions in addition to those relating to access that
foreshadowed the efforts at more broad-based system reform discussed later in this Essay,
including provisions relating to increased spending for prevention and screening programs, an
initial investment in health information technology to help fund a pilot program on computerized
physician order entry, the launching of a State-wide infection prevention program, the creation of
the Massachusetts Quality and Cost Council and the Health Disparities Council and inclusion of
wellness programs under insurance policies. The author wishes to thank Senator Richard T. Moore,
Senate Chairman of the Joint Committee on Health Care Financing of the Massachusetts
Legislature, for his insights on the scope of Chapter 58.
12. The approval of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, within the federal
Department of Health and Human Services, was needed for a Medicaid waiver that would allow
federal financial participation in the proposed subsidized program. The approval of this waiver was
crucial to the economics of the overall program.
35
3
Weiner: Is Massachusetts Leading the Way Again?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
under Chapter 58. The debate over health care reform at the federal level
included expressions of the need for broader reform of the delivery system and
for changes in payment mechanisms to encourage a more organized and efficient
system for delivering care. There were similar expressions of intent enunciated in
Massachusetts as the coalition that successfully secured the enactment of Chapter
58 indicated a desire to move on to seek system delivery and payment reform.
Just as Massachusetts was a leader in securing access changes, can the history of
post-Chapter 58 initiatives in Massachusetts serve as a model for likely changes
at the national level that could be leveraged from enactment of the PPACA? This
Essay addresses the efforts made in Massachusetts to seek further reforms, and
then considers whether the steps taken there may serve as a further model for
national efforts, in other states or through the federal government.
I. CHAPTER 305: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMS
What may be considered the second phase of Massachusetts's efforts to
establish health care reform occurred two years following the enactment of
Chapter 58, with passage of Chapter 305 of the Acts of 2008.13 Chapter 305 is a
blueprint for a broad array of reforms seeking improvements in the cost and
quality of health care services.14
Of greatest significance for this Essay, Chapter 305 mandated studies and
public hearings to promote a greater understanding of the factors that increase
provider costs and insurance premiums, with the expectation that such an
understanding could lead to recommendations to facilitate radical changes in the
structure of, and payment for, health care services. This Essay examines three of
these mandates and the response they have generated, to gain some insight into
the potential outcome of similar efforts that might be undertaken either federally
or in other States to address structural reforms to contain the cost of health care.
A. Payment Reform Commission
Chapter 305 mandated the formation of a Special Commission on the Health
Care Payment System (the "Special Commission"), "to investigate reforming and
13. Act of Aug. 10, 2008, ch. 305, 2008 Mass. Acts 697.
14. Chapter 305 addressed a broad set of topics in health care, including, as examples only:
enhancement of quality and patient safety (§§ 9, 10, 17, 2008 Mass. Acts at 707, 708, 713);
improvement in resources to respond to the increase in primary care demand following on
implementation of Chapter 58 (§§ 8, 29, 31-34, 40, 2008 Mass. Acts at 705, 719, 719-721, 722);
state-wide dissemination of interoperable electronic health records and requirements for proficiency
in health information technology (§§ 4, 15, 36-37, 51, 2008 Mass. Acts at 701, 713, 713, 725);
reducing the influence of pharmaceutical and device manufacturers on prescriber behavior (§§ 14,
15, 2008 Mass. Acts at 710-713); and improvement in the quality of life associated with end-of-life




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss1/4
PAYMENT REFORM AFTER PPACA
restructuring the [delivery] system to provide incentives for efficient and
effective patient-centered care and to reduce variations in the quality and cost of
care."' 5 The Commission was charged with examining alternatives to fee-for-
service payment methodologies' 6 and recommending a common, all-payer
payment methodology intended to promote a number of public values
(coordination of care, rewarding primary care, reducing waste, decreasing
unnecessary hospitalizations, etc.).' 7
The Special Commission's final report, released in July 2009,"
recommended a five-year transition to a global payment system based on risk-
bearing accountable care organizations.19 The recommendations also included
suggestions regarding an oversight agency 20 to oversee implementation of the
new payment system during the five-year period, to monitor increases in the cost
of care, and perhaps to intervene in the event that cost increases exceeded certain
pre-determined benchmarks. 2'
The Special Commission's recommendations require legislation in order to
implement and have generated extensive discussion within Massachusetts
22
regarding payment reform. The recommendations anticipated legislative
15. § 44(a), 2008 Mass. Acts at 723.
16. § 44(c)(i), 2008 Mass. Acts at 724.
17. §§ 44(c)(ii), 44(c)(iii), 2008 Mass. Acts at 724.
18. See MASS. SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE HEALTH CARE PAYMENT Sys., RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE HEALTH CARE PAYMENT SYSTEM (2009), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/pc/FinalReport/FinalReport.pdf.
19. Id. at 10, 13.
20. Id. at 17-18.
21. Id. at 63.
22. For example, the Massachusetts Hospital Association has issued a series of five reports
exploring elements of the recommendations and their implications in depth. See MASS. Hosp.
Ass'N, MASSACHUSETTS PAYMENT REFORM: AN OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES
(2009), available at http://www.mhalink.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Cost Containment
Payment Reform&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=7664; MASS. Hosp. Ass'N,
MASSACHUSETTS PAYMENT REFORM: SUPPORT FOR SOCIETAL NEEDS: A CRITICAL ISSUE To ADDRESS
IN PAYMENT REFORM (2010), available at http://www.mhalink.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
CostContainmentPaymentReform&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=996 1;
MASS. HosP. Ass'N, MASSACHUSETTS PAYMENT REFORM: BENEFIT DESIGN AND BEYOND:
CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN PAYMENT REFORM (2010), available at
http://www.mhalink.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=CostContainment_Payment Reform&Templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=10372; MASS. HosP. ASS'N, MASSACHUSETTS PAYMENT
REFORM: OVERSEEING THE TRANSITION (2010), available at http://www.mhalink.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=MHA News I &template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD= 1255
3; HAROLD D. MILLER, MASS. HosP. Ass'N, MASSACHUSETTS PAYMENT REFORM: CREATING
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS (2009), available at
37
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proposals aimed at long-term system reform. They did not address interim
legislative steps, although, as is discussed later in this Essay,23 this is the
approach the Massachusetts legislature has chosen to use while the discussion on
broader changes presumably continues.
B. Study ofInsurer and Hospital Reserves
Public policy concerns about provider costs include consideration of the
levels of reserves that providers maintain. Theoretically, the accumulation of
"excessive" reserves by hospitals, and specifically non-profit hospitals with no
obligation to make equity holder distributions, could generate investment in plant
and equipment that, regardless of merit, could put pressure on the underlying
medical loss ratio of insurance premiums. Chapter 305 sought to explore this
issue by authorizing the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and
Policy (the "Division"), working with the Division of Insurance ("DOI"), to
"examine options and alternatives available to the Commonwealth to provide
regulation, oversight and disposition of the reserves, endowments, and surpluses
of health insurers and hospitals." 24 Health insurer reserves are generally subject
to regulation to promote insurer solvency. There is, however, much less
analytical material supporting an understanding about the appropriate levels of
reserves for hospitals or health care systems and how they might be regulated.
With regard to hospitals, Chapter 305 mandated the Division to examine
existing regulatory schemes, recent hospital fiscal practices, and financial
reporting; and to review the methods by which hospitals fund community benefit
programs, including how such funding may be regulated elsewhere.25
In May 2010, the Division issued its "Study of the Reserves, Endowments,
and Surpluses of Hospitals in Massachusetts."26 The study describes a number of
financial and accounting rules relating to hospital and health system reporting,
and identifies the lack of clear standards for measuring the adequacy of hospital
reserves. It did, however, suggest indirectly that there might be a standard to
measure "excessive" reserves through a series of tests that determine whether a
hospital has "considerable accumulated financial resources."27 To date there has
http://www.mhalink.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=CostContainment Payment Reform&Templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=9056.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 62-75.
24. Act of Aug. 10, 2008, ch. 305, § 35, 2008 Mass. Acts 697.
25. § 35(b), 2008 Mass. Acts at 721.
26. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & POLICY, STUDY OF THE RESERVES, ENDOWMENTS,
AND SURPLUSES OF HOSPITALS IN MASSACHUSETES (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/
Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/I 0/hospital reserves report.pdf.
27. Id. at 3-4. The Massachusetts Hospital Association has criticized the report for leading to
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been no regulatory or legislative action as a result of the Division's report. But it
did focus on the differences in reserve levels among hospitals in the
Commonwealth, on the uses of unrestricted reserves, and on the potential for
drawing a correlation between levels of unrestricted cash and prices for health
28care services.
C. Hearings on the Drivers ofProvider Costs and Payer Premiums
Chapter 305 expanded the existing authority of the Division to gather cost
information from hospitals 29 in order to develop and implement regulations for
uniform reporting of information from public and private health care payers. The
data collected is intended to allow the Division to analyze changes over time-
and compare public and private payers-with regard to insurance premium
levels, benefit and cost-sharing designs, and plan cost and utilization. 3 0 Among
the types of plan information the Division is authorized to gather is medical loss
ratio, level of reserves and surpluses, and provider payment methods and levels.3 1
Chapter 305 requires the Division to hold annual public hearings based on
the provider and payer information it gathers. 32 The hearings are to focus on
provider and payer cost trends, "with particular attention to factors that contribute
to cost growth" and "to the relationship between provider costs and payer
premium rates." 33 The statute also authorizes the attorney general to intervene in
such proceedings, and grants her independent authority to "review and analyze
any information" the Division derives from providers and payers.34 Based on the
information provided at the hearings, and other information the Division
considers necessary, as defined in regulations, the Division is to prepare "an
annual report concerning spending trends and underlying factors, along with any
recommendations for strategies to increase the efficiency of the health care
system."35
In March 2010, the Division held four days of hearings in accordance with
hospitals are awash in cash, when, in fact, the opposite is true." See Press Release, Mass. Hosp.
Ass'n, Study Reveals Hospitals Hold Inadequate Surpluses and Reserves; State's Narrow Focus
Paints Inaccurate Picture of Hospital Finances (June 25, 2010), http://www.mhalink.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=MHANewsl&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD= 136
2.
28. See MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & POLICY, supra note 26.
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1 18G, § 6 (2010).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 6 2 (a).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 6 Yi (b).
35. Id. § 6 '/2 (g).
39
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the statute.36 In conjunction with these hearings, the attorney general issued a
report regarding health care cost drivers.3 ' Her report emphasized the
predominant role of market share over such other factors as case mix and quality,
giving some providers leverage to secure preferential rates.38 The report's stress
on market share as the key factor in defining price differentials among providers
generated significant controversy. 39 The responses to the report highlight the
complexities of seeking to establish one predominant factor to explain variations
in payer rates, but the report contributed valuable data to the health care cost
discussion by displaying the relative rates paid to specific hospital and physician
groups by the major private payers.
II. EFFORTS AT SHORT-TERM FIXES: THE SMALL GROUP/NON-GROUP MARKET
While discussions commenced about seeking long-term systemic changes
based on the studies and hearings that Chapter 305 initiated, more immediate
political imperatives loomed in the Commonwealth. The financial burden posed
by health insurance costs on small business has been a persistent bone of
contention. While there are multiple causes for what seem like disproportionate
increases in premiums for this class of insurance purchasers, with provider rates
being only one factor, health care cost increases as reflected in insurance
premiums is an issue of special sensitivity to small business. Recognizing this
concern and also facing a re-election campaign in which his principal opponent
was likely to be the former chief executive of one of the major health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) in Massachusetts, Governor Deval Patrick
decided to emphasize urgency in addressing health care costs, at least as reflected
36. The preliminary report, the schedule of witnesses, and its final report based on the hearings
may be accessed on its web site at http://www.mass.gov/dhcfp/costtrends.
37. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/healthcare/
final_report w cover appendicesglossary.pdf.
38. Id. at 3-4.
39. Letter from Melinda Reid Hatton, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Am. Hosp.
Ass'n, to Martha Coakley, Attorney Gen., Mass. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.aha.org/
aha/letter/2010/100429-cl-costs.pdf. Partners HealthCare System, Inc., the largest health care
system in the Commonwealth, commissioned a consultant study to critique the methodology used
by the attorney general's office precisely for its failure to draw statistically more appropriate
correlations with other factors that would explain price differences. See PAUL DREYER, ANALYSIS
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TITLED "EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND
COST DRIVERS" (2010), available at http://multimedia2.heraldinteractive.com/misc/
DreyerFinal.pdf. In turn, the attorney general's office defended itself against this critique. Letter
from Thomas O'Brien, Assistant Attorney Gen. & Chief, Health Care Div., Mass. Attorney Gen., to
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in health insurance premiums for small business, and to propose what were
explicitly intended to be short-term interventions while debate continued about
longer-term systemic change.
A. Emergency Regulations
On February 10, 2010, the Governor announced that DOI would adopt a set
of emergency regulations under existing statutory authority, to address small
business concerns about the cost of health care coverage. In announcing the
emergency regulations, Governor Patrick explicitly related increases in small
group premiums to underlying provider costs. 4 0 The connection seemed to reflect
an assumption that the private sector would use its contracting authority vis-it-vis
providers to undertake cost containment measures that the government could not
directly institute, absent new legislative authority. That is, the Administration
seemed to promote a substitution of private regulation for public regulation,
notwithstanding the former's lack of due process constraints.4 1
Under existing authority at the time, HMOs were required to "submit
proposed rates and benefits, or changes thereof, on or before their effective
dates" and "are subject to the Commissioner's disapproval if the benefits and
rates do not meet" statutory requirements.42 In practice, insurers filed proposed
rates the day that they were to become effective. Following on Governor
Patrick's direction, DOI promulgated emergency regulations relating to HMO
rate filings specifically for changes to premiums and rating factors for small
groups, to be effective on April 1, 2010.
On April 1, 2010, DOI rejected 235 of the 274 rate filings on the grounds
that they failed to meet the statutory requirement that rates not be excessive or
unreasonable in relation to the benefits provided, and thus effectively froze the
rates at their April 2009 level. 4 3 The Massachusetts Association of Health Plans
and several HMOs brought suit and sought emergency injunctive relief to enjoin
40. Governor Deval L. Patrick, Remarks to the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce
Regarding Small Business Jobs Bill (Feb. 10, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=gov3terminal&L=3&LO=Home&LI=Media+Center&L2=Speeches
&sid=Agov3&b=terminalcontent&f-text 2010-02-1 Ojobs&csid=Agov3) (proposing "an
oversight plan to screen provider rate increases").
41. For a discussion of this point, see Stephen M. Weiner, On Public Values and Private
Regulation: Reflections on Cost Containment Strategies, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 269
(1981).
42. 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 43.08 (2005) (emphasis added).
43. Press Release, Office of Consumer Affairs & Bus. Regulation, Patrick-Murray
Administration's Division of Insurance Announces Decision on Rate Increase Submissions from
Health Insurers (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=ocapressrelease
&L=I&LO=Home&sid=Eoca&b-pressrelease&f=20100401_hirates&csid=Eoca; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 176G § 16.
41
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the Commissioner from prohibiting the plans from implementing their proposed
rate increases. 4 4 The suit contended that the Commissioner had impermissibly
disapproved the proposed rate increases based on a predetermined, arbitrary and
inadequate rate increase limit that was not actuarially sound. It also challenged
the requirement that rates remain at the April 2009 level.45 The Superior Court
denied the motion for injunctive relief on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not
exhausted their administrative remedies and had not demonstrated entitlement to
injunctive relief.46 It later ordered two of the plans to continue to use the April
2009 base rates (as modified by approved adjustments) during the pendency of
administrative hearings and appeals.4 7
One of the affected plans requested an administrative hearing. In order to
prevail, it was obliged to demonstrate that each of the four independent bases for
DOI's rate disapprovals was incorrect. 4 8 The administrative hearing was
conducted by three DOI staff hearings officers, who, much to the surprise of
most observers, unanimously overturned the Commissioner's decision and found
in favor of the plan on all four grounds.4 9
The grounds and the rationale for the hearings officers' rejection of them are
instructive with respect both to the current state of confusion regarding what
drives health care costs and attendant premium increases (making the
development of coherent public policy difficult) and to any expectation that
insurers would be able to exercise regulatory authority over provider rates
(notwithstanding contractual obligations and market realities). The four bases for
the initial decision and the rationale for the decision being overturned are as
follows:
(1) The Commissioner found that the plan failed to demonstrate that it
paid providers differing rates of reimbursement based solely on quality,
patient mix, geographical location of care, and intensity of services, as
44. Massachusetts Ass'n of Health Plans v. Murphy, No. 10-1377-BL52 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr.
12, 2010) (order denying preliminary injunction). The other named plaintiffs were Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts HMO Blue, Inc.,
Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., Health New England, Inc.,
Neighborhood Health Plan, Inc., and Tufts Associated Health Maintenance Organization, Inc.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Massachusetts Ass'n of Health Plans v. Murphy, No. 10-1377-BLS2, (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr.
23, 2010) (order granting preliminary injunction). The two plans enjoined from raising rates were
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc. and Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc.
48. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc. v. Div. of Ins., No. R2010-02 (Mass. Div. of Insurance
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specified in the emergency regulations.50 Reflecting the principal thrust
of the attorney general's report cited above,5 the hearings officers found
that the variations were "due primarily to the market power of certain
providers, which derives from size, brand reputation or geographic
location," and determined that the plan had valid reasons to justify
differential reimbursement beyond the four factors specified in the
emergency regulation.52
(2) The Commissioner found that the plan's rates were unreasonable
and excessive because it had failed to demonstrate that it had taken
adequate steps to renegotiate rates with providers and had not
demonstrated that it had decreased its provider costs by renegotiating
those rates. The hearings officers ruled that the plan had established
that there were legal, practical and market place barriers to reopening
existing provider contracts, but that it had nonetheless made efforts to
renegotiate rates within the short time allowed by DOI.54
(3) The Commissioner had limited the plan's overall assumed trend rate
to a range of 100% to 150% of the New England Regional Medical CPI
("CPI-M"). The hearings officers ruled that using the increase of the
CPI-M for New England as the sole criterion for deciding whether to
disapprove the plan's rates was incorrect.55
(4) The Commissioner found that the plan had failed to demonstrate that
it was adequately controlling utilization.56 The hearings officers found
that the plan had "demonstrated its cost containment programs,"
documented its realized cost savings, and proved that its cost
50. 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 43.08(10) (2010). The emergency regulations provided "If the
HMO intends to pay similarly situated providers different rates of reimbursement, [it must include
with its filing] a detailed description of the bases for the different rates including, but not limited to:
(a) Quality of care delivered; (b) Mix of patients; (c) Geographic location at which care is provided;
and (d) Intensity of services provided."
51. See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, supra note 37.
52. The DOI noted, "[t]he Emergency Regulation does not characterize the four articulated
Regulatory bases as the exclusive bases for justifying differential reimbursement." Harvard Pilgrim
Health Care, Inc. v. Div. of Ins., supra note 48, at 5 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 10-15. The hearings officers cited several reasons for this conclusion: (1) it was
purely backward-looking and did not measure costs comparable to the plan's costs, (2) focusing on
the rate of increase, to the exclusion of the actual premium number, would permit anomalous
results, and (3) using a metric external to the plan as the sole factor to determine whether the plan's
proposed rates were excessive violated actuarial and regulatory principles and contravened the
statutory requirement that rates be adequate. Id.
56. Id. at 15-16.
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containment programs were adequate.
Following the hearings officers' rulings, based on further submissions, DOI
reviewed the rates for 200 plans for which HMOs had submitted updated rate
information for the July-September, 2010, period.58 Taking a somewhat less
aggressive approach, it approved single-digit rate increases for 63 plans, stating
that the four insurers at issue had shown more restraint than other companies. 59 It
also required three insurers to supply more data to justify proposed double-digit
rate hikes for 137 plans before it would make a decision. It did not reject outright
any rate proposals. 60 Further, it reached a settlement with the plan that had been
the subject of the hearings officers' decision, with an agreement on rate increases
for April 1, 2010, remarkably close to the level sought by the Commissioner
initially.61
Traditional insurance regulation seeks to assure the fiscal solvency of the
insurance industry in order to protect consumers. In the belief that underlying
provider costs constituted the principal cause for increases in insurance
premiums, the Patrick Administration sought to use existing standards focused on
protecting solvency to address that concern. The brief history of the emergency
regulations, the administrative appeal and the resolution of rate increase requests
served to underscore the limitations of using existing statutory authority to
restrain health care costs per se. It is no surprise, then, that, parallel to the
regulatory efforts, the legislature itself moved to regulate health insurance
premiums in its on-going effort to seek to restrain health care costs.
B. Legislative Developments: The Next Phase
While the reports, hearings and analyses mandated by Chapter 305 pointed
toward efforts for longer term systemic reform of the delivery and payment
systems in Massachusetts, the political imperatives that resulted in the emergency
regulations described above also led to further legislative action, intended to be
of short-term effect while work continued on longer-term reforms. The next
57. Id. at 17.
58. Robert Weisman, State Retains 137 Rate Caps on Insurers, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2010,
at Al. Some Massachusetts health insurers adjust their rate trends at regular increments during the
year for actuarial accuracy, e.g., for the three-month period July-September 2010 in a contract




61. Robert Weisman, Insurer, State in Surprise Accord: Harvard Pilgrim Will Limit Rates and
Drop Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 2010, at Al. See also Press Release, Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care, Inc., Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Settles Rate Dispute With Massachusetts Division Of
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legislative phase of Massachusetts reform was enacted in August 2010 as
Chapter 288 of the Acts of 2010 (Chapter 288). 62
While not taking concrete steps to implement the Special Commission's
recommendations, Chapter 288 establishes a new special commission on provider
price reform, with a general charge to "investigate the rising cost of health care
insurance and the impact of reimbursement rates paid by health insurers to
providers." 6 3 The commission is specifically directed to examine "the variation
in costs of providers for services of comparable acuity, quality and complexity . .
. the correlation between price paid to providers and (1) the quality of care, (2)
the acuity of the patient population, (3) the provider's payor mix, (4) the
provision of unique services, including specialty teaching services and
community services, and (5) operational costs, including labor costs; . . . the
correlation between price paid to providers and, in the case of hospitals, status as
a disproportionate share hospital, a specialty hospital, a pediatric specialty
hospital or as an academic teaching hospital; and . . . policies to promote the use
of providers with low health status adjusted total medical expenses."64 In
developing its recommendations the commission is to consider the Special
Commission's recommendations, and the new commission's recommendations
must be consistent with those recommendations.
Also related to payment reform, Chapter 288 directs the Division to initiate
activities to foster use by payers and providers of bundled payment arrangements
in lieu of fee-for-service.65 The legislation sets for the Division "as an objective,
but not as a requirement, implementation of pilot bundled payment programs
relating to payment for at least 2 acute conditions or procedures commencing by
no later than January 1, 2011" and "for at least 2 chronic conditions commencing
by no later than July 1, 201 1.",6
62. Act of Aug. 10, 2010, ch. 288 (Mass.). Chapter 288 was enacted toward the end of the
2010 legislative session, a session that formally concluded at the end of July. In the debates leading
up to it, there was a serious question as to whether any legislative action would be taken in this
arena that year. See Liz Kowalczyk, Health Payment Overhaul Shelved, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4,
2010, at Al. On July 4, the Boston Globe reported that legislative cost containment efforts in
Massachusetts were on hold for the balance of the calendar year, "largely because of disagreements
among key officials, legislators, and providers over how best to control health care spending." Id.
Senate President Therese Murray, an advocate of payment reform, said that she would not file
legislation to change the system that year, as originally planned, "because of the logistical and
political complexity of changing a system that has been in place for decades." At the time she
expressed the hope that stakeholders would be able to reach a consensus on legislation to be filed in
2011. Id
63. Act of Aug. 10, 2010, § 67(a).
64. Id § 67(c).
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Chapter 288's most significant provisions expand existing insurance
regulatory authority, but not explicitly with the intent of reining in underlying
provider costs. The legislation empowers the Commissioner to require that,
effective October 1, 2010, carriers offering small group insurance plans are to file
for any changes in small group product base rates or rating factors at least ninety
days in advance of the proposed change's effective date. 6 7 The Commissioner is
directed to disapprove a base rate change if it is "excessive, inadequate or
unreasonable in relation to the benefits charged," and a rating factor change if the
change is "discriminatory or not actuarially sound."6
While these standards are consistent with those of traditional insurance
regulatory review, Chapter 288 establishes, temporarily, a novel approach to the
Commissioner's review. The key regulatory change is the requirement that the
Commissioner is to "presumptively" disapprove a base rate change filing on
specified grounds, relating to the insurer's administrative expense and reserves
and surplus. 6 9 The grounds reflect a more nuanced approach to discerning the
factors driving premium increases, and do not directly seek to control underlying
provider costs through premium regulation.70
With regard to payer contracting with providers, Chapter 288 does, however,
promote one mechanism intended to provide better payer bargaining power: a
mandate that any carrier offering a provider network and having five thousand or
more enrollees in small group or individual plans must offer all small business
and individuals in at least one geographic area at least one plan that contains
either a limited network or a tiered network.7 A limited network is one in which
the carrier selects the hospitals that it will include in its products' networks; that
is, it limits the access of its enrollees to only certain providers. A tiered network
is one in which the cost share obligations of individuals accessing care are tiered
67. Act of Aug. 10, 2010, § 29.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. A filing will be "presumptively" disapproved as "excessive" if the administrative expense
loading factor of the base rate, not including taxes and assessments, is projected to increase "by
more than the most recent calendar year's percentage increase in the New England medical CPI,"
or if the aggregate medical loss ratio ("MLR") for all products the carrier offers to small groups is
less than 88% (that percentage rises to 90% effective October 1, 2011). Id. However, if a filing
does not meet the 88% or 90% MLR standard, and therefore would otherwise be presumptively
disapproved, it could nonetheless be approved by the Commissioner if the carrier's aggregate MLR
for all of its small group plans is at least 1% greater than it had been twelve months prior to the
filing-an indication, presumably, that the carrier is making good faith progress to increase its
overall MLR to the required minimum. Id. Further, a filing will also be "presumptively"
disapproved as "excessive" if the carrier's reported contribution to surplus exceeds 1.9% (2.5% if
the carrier's risk-based capital ratio falls below 300% for the most recently reported four quarters).
Id.
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based on the hospital he or she chooses to access, with tiering generally based on
a correlation of the cost and quality of the hospital.72
In order to obtain savings from this benefit design mandate, Chapter 288
requires that the base premium for a limited or tiered network product must be at
least 12% lower than the base premium for the carrier's "most actuarially similar
plan" that does not include such a network.7 3 This differential can be achieved by
means that include, as examples, 74 excluding providers with "similar or lower
quality" (based on standard quality measures to be developed by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health) and with higher health status
adjusted total medical expenses or relative price; or increasing cost share
obligations for members who use providers for non-emergency services with
"similar or lower quality" and with higher health status adjusted total medical
expenses or relative prices. 7
III: LESSONS
In reflecting on the Massachusetts experience post-enactment of Chapter
305, certain observations come to the fore. First, health care is complex. There is
no question that there are varying interests, that one person's cost saving, or
"greater efficiency," is another's "income loss" 76 and that any approach to
addressing the underlying costs of care must be cautious, incremental, and take
cognizance of potential secondary effects of ideas that seem on the surface good.
72. Additional requirements applicable to limited or tiered network plans include the
following: (a) variations among member cost-share obligations in a tiered plan must be "reasonable
in relation to the premium charged as long as the carrier provides adequate access to covered
services at lower patient cost share levels;" (b) the Commissioner is to determine "network
adequacy" for each type of network "based on the availability of sufficient network providers" in
the overall network; (c) in determining network adequacy, the Commissioner is to consider factors
that include location of participating providers, the "employers or members that enroll in the plan;
the range of services provided by providers in the plan; and any plan benefits that recognize and
provide for extraordinary medical needs of members that may not be adequately dealt with by the
providers within the plan network." Id.
73. Act of Aug. 10, 2010, § 32.
74. Through what appears to be a drafting error, while the limited or tiered network
requirements are slated to go into effect on January 1, 2011, these examples of how the 12% may
be achieved are technically effective as of the date of enactment of the Chapter, a date earlier than
the effective date of the imposition of the 12% differential requirement.
75. Act of Aug. 10, 2010, § 33. Other provisions of Chapter 288 require the Division to
elaborate on the definitions of "health status adjusted total medical expenses" and "relative prices."
Id. §§ 11-12.
76. Should Health Benefits Be Taxed?, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/
should-health-benefits-be-taxed (May 15, 2009, 07:43 EST).
77. Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34.
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Second, regulation seems to be reemerging as a valid response to concerns
about health care costs. Health care policy goes in cycles, and one may need to
examine any lessons learned from efforts at provider rate regulation in the 1970s
and 1980s to see whether there is any likelihood that such an approach can have
salutary effects.
Third, insurers and providers need to be brought into a collaborative
framework in which both can work together to achieve change in the system.
Insurers were a little too quick to blame premium increases on providers.7 ' The
experience with the highly publicized Anthem increases proposed in California in
the midst of the national health reform debate indicates that provider rates are not
the only, and may not always be, the principal driver of premium increases.79
Volume, price, underwriting, reserves, administrative expense and profit needs
all have a role to play in varying degrees to produce proposed rates of increase
that outstrip the CPI-M and provider price increases.80 The key to collaboration
should be a recognition that neither group really wants to be, or should be, seen
as responsible for solving the challenge of rising health care costs by itself.
Providers cannot do so without the ability to control volume of service,
something that may be more readily achieved by insurers in the current
environment; and a willingness to take on more service-related risk. Insurers
cannot do so without greater ability to control providers through contract, but that
leverage will vary by market conditions, and the use of private regulation, absent
due process constraints that attend public regulatory authority, could put them in
untenable legal, political and market positions. For payers, shifting service-
related risk to providers, as distinct from underwriting risk, may be attractive.
78. For example, when the DOI hearings officers' decision described infra was announced, the
president and CEO of the plan that brought the administrative appeal was quoted as stating, "It is
time to focus on what is truly driving health care expense, and that is the cost of care. We must
address the prices charged by hospitals and physicians." Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., supra
note 61. Further, in commenting on Chapter 288's impact and recent data regarding continuing high
premium increases for small business, the president of the Massachusetts Association of Health
Plans is quoted as saying that the "rate cap" under Chapter 288 is "a short-term, one hit kind of
gimmick.. It did nothing to deal with the underlying medical costs." Erin Ailworth, Small Firms'
Rates Soaring, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/
business/healthcare/articles/2010/09/23/small firmshealth care rates-soaring.
79. See, e.g., John Rogers, Anthem Blue Cross Withdraws California Rate Increase,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/29/anthem-blue-cross-
withdra n 557966.html.
80. In discussing the continuing increase in base price for small business premiums
notwithstanding Chapter 288's enactment, the Boston Globe noted: "But the base price of a
premium is frequently pushed higher by additional factors, including the size, age, and health of a
company's workforce, and the type of work performed. Smaller businesses are especially
vulnerable to such variables. For instance, one or two employees with serious injuries or long-term
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Rational cost control may very well lie in securing the political will to change
both the payment system and the delivery system in a coordinated manner. That
is, with a thoughtful implementation plan, the Special Commission may have
gotten it more or less right. But the fact that Massachusetts has adopted only an
interim step through Chapter 288 suggests the complexity of the task and the
daunting political risks of undertaking such an effort without careful foresight.
Fourth, both Massachusetts and the federal experiences demonstrate what
could be a truism about health care politics. Health policy and politics operate
along a continuum, with access on one end and cost containment on the other.
Each by itself is conceptually easy to achieve. Promoting access alone could be
successful if no concern is given to the costs of care that will result. Improved
access almost of necessity increases the overall costs of care even if it is possible
to achieve efficiencies in one or more areas of the delivery system. Cost
containment as the principal objective of health care policy can be advanced, at
the other end of the continuum, by rationing care, an equally unlikely political
outcome. Consequently policy is a continuous balancing, a shifting equilibrium
between the poles of access and cost containment. Generally, when the two face
off directly in the political commons, access wins and cost containment concerns
are deferred.8' It is much easier to deal with access, both politically and
conceptually, than to tackle the hard realities-conceptual, political, and
economic-of health care cost control. The Massachusetts experience has
demonstrated that access improvement may be achieved without simultaneously
addressing costs, but eventually the piper must be paid. While at the federal level
Congress and the Administration paid attention to this issue in enacting the
PPACA, especially in light of the attention given to CBO scoring, the federal
government has barely begun to make serious efforts on the cost containment
front. Perhaps Massachusetts's 2011 legislative session will provide more
guidance based on the work done to date in the Commonwealth. Or perhaps we
will continue to temporize around cost and hope that the piper never shows up.
81. See as an example the enactment of the so-called TRICARE for Life program. Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 712, 114
Stat. 1654, 1654A- 176 (2000). TRICARE for Life, which was enacted in a Presidential election
year, extended TRICARE eligibility to persons age 65 and over who would otherwise have lost
their TRICARE eligibility by virtue of becoming eligible for Medicare. That is, TRICARE for Life
provides a Defense Department-funded Medicare supplement program for persons who previously
had been responsible for securing their own supplemental payment coverage from private sources.
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